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INTERNET SYMPOSIUM
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY AND CENSORSHIP OF THE
INTERNET
Professor Julie E. Cohen
Good morning. I would like to thank the Constitutional Law Journal for
inviting me to be here today.
I am not a First Amendment lawyer. I am not really a constitutional law-
yer, so why am I here? I think that after having heard Dan Burk's presenta-
tion, you should realize that intellectual property lawyers need to be First
Amendment lawyers as well. You have all heard the aphorism that the Internet
interprets censorship as a malfunction and routes around it.' You also may
have heard that censorship on the Internet is a terrible thing; in particular, you
may have heard this in the context of debates about pornography on the Inter-
net or hate speech on the Internet. I would like to suggest to you today, how-
ever, that the single most prevalent problem involving censorship on the Inter-
net has to do with the protection of intellectual property.
If you think about it, intellectual property protection, and particularly copy-
right protection, is a form of censorship. That doesn't necessarily make it a
bad thing. We have intellectual property laws for very specific reasons: to
stimulate inventiveness and creativity, and ultimately to encourage the produc-
tion of useful inventions and creative works.2 Although the extent to which
intellectual property is actually necessary to produce these results is an unan-
swered empirical question, it's pretty widely accepted that the intellectual
property laws at least contribute to producing more inventiveness and creativity
than might otherwise exist. Nonetheless, intellectual property laws, and in
particular copyright laws, do censor speech in a way. If you have a copyright
in your original expression, one of the things that means is that, generally
speaking, other people can't reproduce it without your permission. That's a
'The saying was coined by John Gilmore of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See
James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors,
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 178 & n.3 (1997).
2See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
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form of censorship enforced by federal law. So, to be a copyright lawyer is
always in some sense to be a First Amendment lawyer.
There are doctrines in copyright law designed to accommodate First
Amendment concerns. One can't, generally speaking, duplicate someone's
protected expression, but copyright doesn't protect the ideas, facts, methods of
operation, or scientific principles that may be contained in that expression;
these things are considered to be part of the public domain.4 The courts have
recognized that, if it were any other way, copyright would inhibit quite a lot of
speech, which would create First Amendment problems.5 Similarly, the fair
use doctrine provides that in some cases one can duplicate another's creative
expression - not just the facts and the ideas, but the original creative material
as well - if the circumstances warrant it. 6 The idea-expression distinction and
the fair use doctrine are thought to reconcile concerns about inhibiting too
much speech with a felt need to grant proprietary protection to certain types of
speech.7
How does the Internet change any of this? Proposed amendments to the
copyright law that are designed specifically to apply to digital works, and in
particular to works distributed via the Internet, may well alter the balance that
currently exists between proprietary rights and First Amendment concerns.
These amendments concern so-called copyright management technologies,
which are secure digital systems that protect against unauthorized uses of a
digital work.' Such systems now exist as prototypes, and they are potentially
capable of operating at a very fine level of granularity.9 For example, we're
4See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S.
340 (1991); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
5See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc:, 471 U.S. 539,
556-60 (1985).
6See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
7See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-60.
8See Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections About Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 161-62 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 981, 983-87 (1996).
9See, e.g., Jon Bing, The Contribution of Technology to the Identification of Rights, Es-
pecially in Sound and Audio-Visual Works: An Overview, 4 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 234
(1996); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997); Interna-
tional Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations, Committee on New Technologies,
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all familiar with the notion of copy-protection - a technical device that pre-
vents us from making a copy of a piece of software. Copyright management
technologies are similar, but much more sophisticated. We're talking about
something that might count each time one opens one's copy of the protected
work, and levy an electronic debit. It might levy fractional charges if one
wanted to read or print only an excerpt, rather than the whole work. Copy-
right management systems can be designed to do pretty much whatever the
copyright owner wants to do. Once it's possible to set up the electronic debit-
ing system to work in conjunction with the technological protection, copyright
management systems can become fully operational. The proposed amendments
to the Copyright Act would add another layer of protection on top of that layer
of technological protection, by making it illegal and in some cases even crimi-
nal for readers to tamper with those protective mechanisms, or to remove any
of the information attached to the digital file to identify the copyright owner
and specify the terms of use. o
How might these proposed amendments affect the copyright-First Amend-
ment balance? They might do so in two ways. The first of these ways relates
to what I call the right to read anonymously, which I have written about in a
previous article. "
Copyright management systems contemplate not only regulating and billing
for uses of digital works, but also storing the information that these activities
generate. This would include information about what works particular indi-
viduals have purchased and what parts of those works they're reading or
copying. 2 These databases would be much like the databases that many other
merchants maintain now, except that from the individual's point of view there's
a substantial difference, I think, between someone's knowing that one likes to
buy Tropicana orange juice and Ivory soap, on the one hand, and what ideas
and information one considers to be important, on the other. One might, for
example, be looking for material about HIV infection, or about a shoe fetish.
Digital Rights Management Technologies <http://www.ncri.com/articles/rights_ manage-
ment/ >.
'
0See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
(passed by the Senate, May 14, 1998); WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R.
2281, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (reported to the House and referred jointly and sequentially to
the Committees on Commerce and Ways and Means, May 22, 1997).
"Julie Cohen, A Right to Read'Anonymously, supra note 8. The paper is also available
on the Internet via the Social Science Research Network Web site's "cyberlaw" page. See
< http://www.ssrn.com/>.
12See Cohen, Some Reflections, supra note 8, at 183-85.
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This seems to be the kind of thing that might make at least some of us uncom-
fortable, in ways that revealing our grocery preferences might not.
Clearly, this sort of monitoring raises privacy concerns. That's not what I
want to talk about. Rather, I want to suggest that, separate from the question
of privacy generally and the question of the exact contours of any constitutional
right of privacy, there is support in First Amendment jurisprudence and First
Amendment theory for what we might call a right of intellectual privacy.
Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions suggest
that the Court views anonymity in a variety of contexts as central to the free
exercise of the First Amendment rights of speech and association. The anony-
mous political leafleting cases, most recently the McIntyre case, talk about the
centrality of anonymity to political speech, which is one of the core kinds of
speech that the First Amendment protects.13 The McCarthy-era cases, although
they go both ways, contain language about the illegitimacy of probing into the
reading activities of public employees, or into the contents of mail received via
the United States Postal Service. 4 Another line of cases, many of which also
date from the McCarthy era and the civil rights era, concern disclosure of
membership lists. In these cases, the Court made clear that because in some
cases membership in or association with a particular group might be controver-
sial, it would shelter that right of association, and require some showing of
need before disclosure could be compelled. 5 Finally, even in the pornography
cases, particularly Stanley v. Georgia, there is language disapproving invasion
of the privacy of a person's home library, and inquiring what that person reads
in the privacy of his or her own home.' 6 These cases are compromised to a
degree by later cases that say it is unlawful to transport pornography across
state lines, or to possess certain kinds of pornography at all.' 7 Nonetheless, I
think that the general principle still holds true: the Court has recognized that it
would greatly chill freedoms of expression and association if the contents of a
person's intellectual life could be laid bare.
3Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995); see also Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
"'
4See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Lamont v. Postmaster General., 381
U.S. 301 (1965); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality)
"
5See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
16394 U.S. 557 (1969).
17See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); United States v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels
of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
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Similarly, one can look to the major strands of First Amendment theory and
find support for the notion that one should be able to cultivate one's intellectual
proclivities within a zone of privacy. If one is of the school of thought that be-
lieves that the main purpose of the First Amendment is to promote political ex-
pression, and only to a lesser degree to promote other kinds of speech, it's
immediately clear that anonymity is essential to that vision. 8 McIntyre says as
much with respect to speech. 9 Reading is the flip side of that coin. How can
one know which ideas and opinions one finds persuasive or congenial until one
knows what is out there? And how can one know what is out there without ex-
ploring? Maybe there are some things we would not explore if somebody was
keeping a list, and our employers or our neighbors could gain access to it.
Other scholars have rejected this approach to the First Amendment, and ar-
gue that the First Amendment represents a broader guarantee of human auton-
omy and self-actualization.2" Everything that I have said about the importance
of allowing a zone of intellectual privacy is equally true under this approach.
What I have talked about is a process of constructing the self. Reading and
listening and viewing help determine who one wants to be, what one wants to
believe, and with whom one wants to associate.
Finally, there are those who prefer not to travel either of those theoretical
roads, and prefer a more process-oriented theory of the First Amendment. Ac-
cording to this vision, the First Amendment exists to provide a zone of safety
for a "marketplace of ideas," within which ideas can battle it out, and the best
and truest will emerge victorious. 2 Even under this theory of the First
Amendment, anonymity plays a central role. The knowledge that someone,
somewhere, might be keeping a list of what one reads could seriously bias the
market. Maybe people would allocate their dollars and their attention differ-
ently if someone were keeping such a list. We could not be sure that the mar-
ket in operation is the same market that would exist if no lists were kept, and
people had the freedom to make their reading decisions anonymously.
8See, e.g., CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (2d ed.
1995).
9Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218-29 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
20See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989).
21The origin of this view in modern First Amendment jurisprudence is Justice Holmes's
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 21, at 6-22 (describing the origins of the marketplace
theory, its application by the Court, and criticisms of the theory that have been developed in
the academic literature).
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This argument relates to what Ed Cavazos talked about earlier this morning:
the notion that public discourse involves a certain amount of homogenizing
pressure. When speakers express opinions that are too extreme, they receive
feedback that edges them toward a more mainstream position. Maybe that's a
good thing when it comes to setting public policy. On the other hand, what I
said about biasing the market holds true as well. We need to give people time
to test out the various ideas that are out there, and to make considered deci-
sions about both personal consumption issues such as pornography and larger
public policy issues, before we try to decide what public opinion is and what
public policy should be. A zone of anonymity within which to make these in-
quiries and personal decisions is critical.
At this point, you may be thinking that the First Amendment doesn't reach
private conduct, and that all I've told you so far is that private content owners
may be implementing technological measures to keep lists of what we read.
That's troubling, but what does the First Amendment have to do with it? It
may be that the First Amendment can't reach that conduct, although I think
there is an argument that might be made that it does.22 I do think, though, that
when Congress amends the copyright law to penalize so-called tampering or
circumvention of these copyright management systems, including tampering by
readers who want to preserve their anonymity, that raises clear First Amend-
ment concerns.23
Think now about New York Times v. Sullivan.24 Libel lawsuits are private
disputes, but the enforcement of defamation law is a public act that implicates
the First Amendment. The First Amendment, in consequence, has things to
say about what defamation law can and cannot do. Because, as I have ex-
plained, the copyright law is so intimately bound up with speech, amendments
to the copyright law also implicate the First Amendment. Before we make any
such changes, we should think about their ramifications for the various rights
that fall under the umbrella of First Amendment protection.
Of course, if we conclude that enforcement of the proposed changes would
affect the exercise of First Amendment rights, there are additional tests that
must be applied to determine whether there is a constitutional violation. We
have to ask, among other things, whether the government has any legitimate
concerns with identifying readers, and whether there are any less restrictive
2This argument is a subject for another occasion. For now, it is sufficient to note that it
would require substantial reconceptualization and revision of the state action doctrine. See,
e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory - A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982).
23See Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 8, at 1019-24.
24376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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means of doing so.' In the article that I mentioned earlier, I argued that the
government does not have such concerns as to most readers, and that less re-
strictive means exist to satisfy the concerns that the government actually has.26
The second way in which the proposed changes to the Copyright Act will
affect the copyright-First Amendment balance concerns the conditions of access
to information. I would like to suggest that the impending changes in the
physical and legal conditions of access to copyrighted works require us to con-
sider whether there is an affirmative right of access to information, or to cer-
tain kinds of information.
Given that the Court has been very wary of saying that there are affirmative
rights to anything under the Constitution,27 why am I suggesting that there are,
and what does that have to do with copyright and copyright management sys-
tems? I have talked about the ways in which copyright doctrine accommodates
First Amendment concerns. The idea-expression distinction and the fair use
doctrine are designed to make sure that in granting proprietary rights in speech,
we don't impede the speech of later speakers by removing essential building
blocks from the public domain. Copyright management technologies threaten
both of these doctrines.
Both the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction take as a core
assumption a certain physical state of information. When these doctrines were
created, there was no technological protection against copying.28 There were
no photocopiers, of course, but one could sit down and copy a work by hand if
one chose to do so. The copyright law simply did not contemplate the kind of
technology that would bar all copying. Now, in strictly technical terms, that's
a bit of an oversimplification. Obviously, one could sit in front of one's com-
puter screen and transcribe its contents by hand. What one could not do with-
out permission, however, is to print or copy a paragraph and excerpt it in a
critical review. More important, one could not do this if, in order to gain ac-
cess to the work in the first place, one had to click one's acceptance of terms in
a digital license agreement, and to agree not to reuse the copyrighted expres-
"See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
26Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 8, at 1024-30.
"7See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"Both doctrines originated in nineteenth-century court decisions interpreting the version
of the Copyright Act then in force. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879)
(idea-expression distinction); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story,
J.) (fair use doctrine).
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sion or the noncopyrightable information in any way.29 Even if theoretically
permitted under the fair use doctrine or the idea-expression distinction, such
reuse would be a breach of contract. Similarly, the reverse engineering of
software could be barred by a combination of technology and contractual pro-
visions prohibiting decompilation, even though courts have made clear that de-
compilation is a fair use of the creative content because it is necessary to gain
access to the unprotected elements of the software: its ideas and operating prin-
ciples.30
Suddenly, through a combination of digital technology and contract, the fair
use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction have become things that exist at
the whim of the individual copyright owner. That is an extremely troubling
thought, if one considers the original purpose of these doctrines, which I have
described as (at least in part) that of accommodating First Amendment con-
cerns about censorship. It seems odd that we would contemplate amending the
copyright law to make it easy for private parties to create a situation in which
copying and reuse simply are not possible, even where necessary to enable
what has always been considered protected speech. Given that we know, be-
cause of New York Times v. Sullivan, that we could not constitutionally amend
the defamation laws to lower the standards for establishing libel or slander of a
public figure, can we allow Congress to amend the copyright law to make it so
easy for the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction to disappear?
I suggest that the answer is, clearly, no.
The fair use doctrine has always been raised as a defense. The status of the
idea-expression distinction is more ambiguous, but it typically is raised defen-
sively in infringement litigation. Copyright owners, particularly those pro-
moting the use of copyright management systems, are fond of saying that all
use of another's creative expression is presumptively infringing, but that in
certain cases one might have a defense that excuses one's conduct. If one un-
derstands copyright as animated by the First Amendment as well as by utilitar-
ian concerns about stimulating creativity, I believe that this view becomes
problematic. Rather, we need to consider whether, even though courts are re-
luctant to recognize affirmative rights, there is a certain minimal amount of ac-
cess to information that people need to have in order to participate in public
discourse and to be functioning citizens - as well as, in some cases, to be fu-
ture creators of copyrighted works. If that access requires tampering with or
29See U.C.C. Art. 2B, §§ 2B-310, -715, -716 (proposed draft April 1998); see generally
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. _
(forthcoming 1998) (discussing whether as a matter of contract law, privacy law, and copy-
right law such contracts should be permissible).
3
°See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (1 lth Cir. 1996); Sega Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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circumventing copyright management technologies, so be it. Alternatively,
considerations of access might require that copyright management systems be
designed to allow certain types of reuse, or that certain terms in non-negotiated
mass-market contracts be disallowed.3"
I think that this argument finds, although implicitly, some textual support in
the structure of Constitution. The copyright clause is in the body of the Con-
stitution, and the First Amendment modifies the entire text, including Article I,
section 8, clause 8.32 I also believe that First Amendment doctrine does not
rule out this result. Although there is a First Amendment right not to speak,33
it would be strange to say that a copyright owner who has held a work out for
public purchase can then invoke his or her First Amendment right not to speak
as a basis for refusing the kind of access that the idea-expression doctrine and
the fair use doctrine are intended to guarantee.34 We are not talking about pri-
vate diaries here, but about works that are placed on the market for strangers to
consume.
In one sense, the argument for an affirmative right of access to information
is a reach, and I recognize that. In another sense, though, it is both timely and
compelling, because we now have a state of technological affairs that makes it
necessary to think about this question for the first time in our history. As I
said at the start, it seems strange that all the fuss about censorship of Internet
speech is focused on things like pornography when the scope of intellectual
property protection may have such enormous effect on the information each of
us sees, and on the circumstances under which we see it. Particularly given the
direction in which copyright management technologies and copyright law seem
to be moving, I believe that it would be a good idea to refocus the debate about
Internet speech to address these issues, which are so central to our lives.
Thank you.
31See, e.g., Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 29 (discussing enforceability of mass-market
license terms, enforced by copyright management systems, that conflict with copyright);
Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the Interests of
Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 7 AM. PROGRAMMER 1 (1997) (considering design alter-
natives for copyright management systems).
32U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
'See Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 8, at 1015-19; Robert A. Kre-
iss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1995).
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